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1 Introduction
Currently, there is a broad discussion about the deployment of ﬁber-based Next Generation
Access Networks (NGA) in the telecommunications markets. Due to the importance of
telecommunications infrastructures for economic growth1, the European Commission set
ambitious targets regarding the coverage with “ultra-fast broadband” infrastructures.2 The
roll-out of new access ﬁber networks and the replacement of (large parts of) the existing
copper networks, which represented the core telecommunication infrastructure for decades,
change the requirements for regulation. The main objective shifted from the optimization
of allocative efﬁciency by the introduction of service-based competition to more dynamic
aspects, i.e. the stimulation of investment incentives, while ensuring an adequate level of
competition.3
In general, investing ﬁrms face two different kinds of risk, market risk and regulatory risk.
The market risk describes the uncertainty whether the new infrastructure and emerging
services generate sufﬁcient demand and willingness to pay to amortize the investments.
Dealing with market risk is a typical task of ﬁrms in innovative markets and broadly
discussed especially in the R&D literature.4 The difference in network industries is the
existence of regulatory constraints.5 The regulatory risk describes the risk that sunk
investment costs are not considered sufﬁciently by regulatory authorities.6 In the context of
NGA and the existing market risk, this problem is of great importance. In particular, there
is a risk that investment costs are only taken into account if the new infrastructure succeeds,
i.e. if there is sufﬁcient demand, and that the investing ﬁrm has to bear all costs if the NGA
fails. Hence, there is a risk of an asymmetric risk allocation between investing and access
seeking ﬁrms. In view of these risks and the extensive investment requirements related to
the NGA roll-out7, the opportunities of cooperation and joint investments in the network of
ﬁrms, which compete in the retail markets, have become a more important topic recently.
The New Regulatory Framework8 allows the introduction of some regulatory instruments
to consider the risk related to investments in new infrastructures and the trade-off between
static and dynamic efﬁciency. In general, the private and social incentives to provide the
1Cf. Röller & Waverman (2001), OECD (2008), Fornefeld et al. (2008), or Czernich et al. (2011).
2Cf. COM (2010) 245 and IP/10/1142. The objective is to ensure broadband access with 30 MBit/s for all and
with 100 MBit/s for at least half of all European households by 2020.
3As Laffont & Tirole (2001, p.7) pointed out, there exists a Schumpetrian trade-off between static efﬁciency, i.e.
an intense (service-based) competition with a given infrastructure and encouraging investments ex ante.
4Cf. Dixit & Pindyck (1994) for a general discussion of uncertain investments.
5Cf. Dobbs (2004) for an analysis of an investment game with demand uncertainty in a regulated market.
6Guthrie (2006) provides a comprehensive overview of the effect of different regulation regimes and their
impact on investment incentives in network industries with emphasis on regulatory risk.
7Cf. Elixmann et al. (2008), Katz et al. (2010). Subject to the used technology, the costs of providing broadband
access is estimated between 300e and 2200e per household.
8Cf. COM (2009) 140.
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new infrastructures do not differ fundamentally as ﬁrms have incentives to tap into new
markets. Hence, an important question is how the regulatory framework might support
and foster the private investment incentives such that socially desirable objectives might be
achieved with a minimum of regulatory interventions.
In the economic literature as well as in practice, the effects of regulation on investment are
heavily disputed.9 In this paper, I focus on a recent work by Nitsche & Wiethaus (2011) and
extend their framework model. Nitsche & Wiethaus (NW hereafter) compare different regu-
latory regimes regarding the effects on investment incentives, the competition intensity and
the resulting consumer surplus in a two-stage Cournot model with two ﬁrms, a vertically
integrated incumbent and an access seeking entrant. Similar to Klumpp & Su (2010), the
access price used by NW considers total investment costs as well as the ﬁrms’ usage of the
new infrastructure. In the presence of uncertainty regarding the success of the NGA, NW
compare long run incremental cost regulation (LRIC), a regime with asymmetric risk allocation
in which the entrant only bears part of the investment costs if the NGA is a success, to three
alternatives. First, NW consider a full distribution of costs regulation (FD) with symmetric
risk allocation in which the entrant bears part of the investment costs even if the NGA fails.
Secondly, they consider a risk sharing regulation (RS) in which both ﬁrms jointly deploy and
use the new infrastructure without any further access fees. Thirdly, they consider regulatory
holidays (RH), i.e. a regime in which the incumbent has no access obligations for the NGA.
NW’s results are three-part: First, for a given investment level risk-sharing yields the highest
competitive intensity, i.e. the highest expected total quantity, and LRIC performs better
than full distribution. Secondly, the investment incentives are highest with full distribution
and regulatory holidays followed by risk-sharing and LRIC. Thirdly, the consumer surplus
is always maximized with the risk-sharing regime and full distribution always outperforms
LRIC.
In the following, I adjust NW’s model regarding several aspects. As a main difference I
assume price competition in the retail market. The intense price competition and the ﬁerce
service-based competition in the European broadband markets10 is a potential obstacle for
investments in NGA as new services are rarely available yet and the new access networks
compete directly with the old technologies.11 Moreover, investment in telecommunications
infrastructures, such as a ﬁber or cable network, are typically characterized by lumpy sunk
investment costs and the opportunity to serve all consumers connected to the infrastructure
9Cf. Cambini & Jiang (2009) for a comprehensive overview of empirical as well as theoretical studies regarding
the effects of regulation on investment in broadband markets.
10Cf. COM (2009) 390 or OECD (2009).
11Cf. Bourreau et al. (2011) for an analysis how access regulation and competition in an old infrastructure
negatively affects the incentives to invest in new infrastructures.
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in a speciﬁc area. Hence, the ﬁrms’ ex post behavior is driven by these two aspects and
competition is more about the utilization of the infrastructure than about a capacity choice.12
An additional aspect in my model is the consideration of horizontal product differentiation.
Even if ﬁrms compete in the same market, retail products are no perfect substitutes by
themselves, e.g. due to different preferences of consumers or slightly different services.13
Furthermore, some of the emerging services are quite heterogeneous but use, at least partially,
the same infrastructure. For instance, the provision of smart metering requires access to
telecommunications infrastructures. Consequently, one might think about situations in
which ﬁrms provide heterogeneous service bundles, e.g. one ﬁrm provides smart metering
and one ﬁrm provides IP-TV whereas both offer additionally broadband access to their retail
consumers.
Another extension of NW’s model is the interpretation of their risk-sharing regime. As
ﬁrms, even from different infrastructure industries such as telecommunications and elec-
tricity, jointly roll-out and use (parts of) the infrastructure without any further access fee,
I interpret this setup explicitly as cooperation between ﬁrms. This has two effects on the
modeling: First, an important question is whether the ﬁrms are willing to cooperate as they
cannot be forced to do so by regulatory authorities. Therefore, I add another stage of the
game in which the ﬁrms decide whether to cooperate or not given the implemented access
regime. Note that access to the infrastructure might also be interpreted as access to ducts of
other infrastructure providers. Secondly, I consider a positive payment from the entrant to
the incumbent in this setup, i.e. the entrant bears a ﬁxed part of the investment costs.
Given these extensions, the results partly differ from NW’s ﬁndings and give some further
insights. In contrast to NW, there is no single regime which always yields highest investment
as full distribution as well as cooperation might maximize the investment incentives subject to
the degree of product differentiation and the probability of success of the new infrastructure.
A supplementary insight is that some access regimes contain a threat of no investment if
the degree of product differentiation is low, i.e. if ﬁrms provide homogeneous goods, even
if the success of the NGA is rather certain. The analysis of the cooperation decision reveals
that the ﬁrms’ incentives to cooperate are subject to the participation of the entrant in the
investment risk and to the regulatory outside option, i.e. the implemented access regime.
Both ﬁrms prefer to cooperate especially if the retail products are rather heterogeneous and
if the success of the NGA is rather uncertain. Another difference concerns the consumer
surplus or total surplus maximizing access regime. In opposite to NW, cooperation is not
always the socially desirable regime. The welfare analysis shows that the optimal regulatory
policy is mainly subject to the degree of product differentiation. While the implementation
12Cf. Kahn (2006).
13See e.g. Laffont et al. (1998).
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of full distribution, i.e. an access regulation with symmetric risk allocation between the ﬁrms,
seems favorable if the products are rather homogeneous, cooperation seems best if products
are rather heterogeneous. Subject to the implemented access regulation, the consumer or
total surplus maximizing regime might be achieved by the private incentives to cooperate.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the setup of
the model. In Section 3, I derive the equilibrium conditions by solving the subgames of the
model recursively. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
The market is served by two ﬁrms, an incumbent denoted by I and an entrant denoted by
E. Both ﬁrms compete in the Internet broadband access market using a given technology,
e.g. DSL, with horizontally differentiated goods. The incumbent may invest in a Next
Generation Access Network (NGA) and the entrant receives (regulated) access to the
incumbent’s network at an access fee w. The roll-out of the new infrastructure is risky as the
demand for new services and therefore the success of the infrastructure is uncertain. With
probability b, consumers will ask for new services based on this infrastructure and with
probability 1  b consumers prefer service which could be provided with the old network.
2.1 Demand
The retail demands of the entrant and the incumbent, qE and qI, are derived from a
representative consumer with the following linear-quadratic utility function:14









The consumer’s reservation utility for broadband access is given by n. For simplicity, let
us assume that the reservation utility is the same for both products. The parameter y is an
indicator function for the success of the NGA. With probability b, there is a demand for new
services and products based on the NGA and y equals 1. In this case, the demand increases
by the extent of the investment x. If there emerge no new services and consumers keep using
the common technology, y equals 0 and the consumers do not have an additional utility
from the new infrastructure. The probability of such a failure of the new technology is 1  b.
The extent of the NGA investment x might be interpreted as different NGA technologies,
e.g. ﬁber-to-the-cabinet (FttC), ﬁber-to-the-building (FttB), or ﬁber-to-the-home (FttH),
14For a detailed description, see Vives (2001, p.145-147). Note that I abstract from the numeraire good.
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which allow for different bandwidths and therefore different service qualities. Horizontal
product differentiation is represented by the parameter s 2 [0,1], whereas s equals 1 for
homogeneous and 0 for independent goods.
Maximizing the utility subject to the budget constraint yields the demand functions
qI =
n   pI   s(n   pE)





n   pE   s(n   pI)




The demand of each ﬁrm increases with the consumer’s willingness to pay for broadband
access n and with price of the competitor and decreases with the ﬁrm’s own price. Addi-
tionally, the ﬁrms’ demand increases with the degree of product differentiation (i.e. if s
decreases). The motivation of this “love of variety” effect is as follow: suppose that the ﬁrms
originate from different industries, e.g. a telecommunications provider and a electricity
supplier, and offer heterogeneous product bundles. For example one ﬁrm provides IP-TV
and the other smart metering while both ﬁrms provide broadband access as an additional
service. Hence, total demand might increase as a higher degree of product differentiation
yields a higher willingness to pay of the consumers but does not change total market size. If
the investment is a success, i.e. for y = 1, the demand increases with the extent of the NGA
roll-out x weighted with the extent of product differentiation. Reconsidering the example
with different NGA technologies, the increasing demand is based on a higher quality of the
network and a vertical product differentiation to the old technology. If the NGA is a failure,
i.e. y = 0, the investment in the NGA has no effect on the demand.
Further, let us consider a benchmark case in which the market is deregulated and no
access obligation exists. The incumbent as monopoly supplier provides services to the retail
consumers. Hence, the demand is independent from the degree of product differentiation,
i.e. s = 0, and the incumbent’s retail demand is given by
qRH
I = n + yx   pRH
I .
The incumbent’s demand increases in the consumer’s willingness to pay n and the extent of




A crucial point regarding the investment incentives is the regulatory framework and existing
access obligations. In the following, I use two different regulatory setups introduced by
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NW in order to compare the investment incentives as well as the effects of these regimes on
competition, i.e. (i) long-run incremental costs regulation and (ii) full distribution of costs
regulation. Moreover, I adjust NW’s (iii) risk-sharing regulation to a setup with cooperation
and consider (iv) an benchmark case with an unregulated monopoly.
By assumption the long-run incremental costs regulation (LRIC) only takes costs of the
currently used network into account. In this setup, this means that the investment costs are
only included in the access fee if the NGA succeeds. This regime gives rise to an asymmetric
allocation of risk between investing and access seeking ﬁrms. If the NGA fails, the NGA
does not yield additional value and competitors will not ask for access to the new network.
The investing ﬁrm bears all investment costs alone. In the case that the NGA becomes a
success, the return of the incumbent is limited as the entrant might ask for access. When
calculating the access charge, the regulator takes the investment costs but not the investment
risk into account and there is an asymmetric allocation of the risk between the ﬁrms.
In the full distribution of costs regulation (FD), the investment costs related to NGA are
considered in the calculation of the access charge even if the NGA is no success and a
symmetric risk allocation is ensured. The access seeking ﬁrm has to bear part of the
investment costs even if the NGA fails and the ﬁrm does not ask for access to the new
infrastructure. This might either be interpreted as a consideration of the investment costs
in the access fee for the old infrastructure, e.g. the price for local loop unbundeling, or as
consideration of the investment costs in the case of virtual unbundling, i.e. the provision of
virtually unbundled wholesale access based on the new technology.
The third regime considered is a cooperation (CO) between the ﬁrms. If the ﬁrms decide to
jointly invest in the infrastructure, the entrant bears part m of the investment costs with a
ﬁxed payment to the incumbent prior to investment and is allowed to use the infrastructure
without any further access payment. I will consider two cases of ﬁxed payments. First, I will
follow NW and assume m = 0 in order to compare my ﬁnding with their results. Thereafter,
I will assume that the ﬁrms share the investment costs, i.e. m 2 [0, 1
2]. This case could be
interpreted as a cooperation in which each ﬁrm builds its own local network as a local
monopolist and both ﬁrms get access to the other ﬁrms’ infrastructure on a bill-and-keep
basis.15 The investment decision in the cooperation case differs from the two regimes above.
With regulated access, the incumbent will only consider its own expected proﬁts in its
investment decision. If both ﬁrms cooperate, I assume that the investment decision is made
such that the joint proﬁts of both ﬁrms are maximized given competition in the retail market.
15 Note that the assumption about bill-and-keep omits the opportunity that both ﬁrms charge each other a
positive fee to increase their marginal costs in order to charge higher prices and to weaken competition.
In the following, we ignore such a setup and possibly negative effects of cooperation on competition are
excluded. For a discussion of this issue in R&D literature, see e.g. Katz (1986) or D’Aspremont & Jacquemin
(1988) .
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The access price is borrowed from Nitsche & Wiethaus (2011, p.3) and reads
w`$ = a`$ f(x)
qI + qE
(4)
where $ = L, FD,CO represents the realized regime, a$ = 0,1 is a regulatory parameter
deﬁning whether the investment costs are considered in the access fee, ` = S, F represents
whether the NGA is a success or not, f(x) are the investment costs for an deployment x,
and qj are the quantities of the ﬁrm j = I,E. Similar to Klumpp & Su (2010), this setup
endogenizes the investment costs in the access fee. Note that the old network is always
subject to access regulation and that the access charge is normalized to zero for the sake
of simplicity.16 An overview of the parameter settings and maximization problems at the







LRIC (L) aS = 1, aF = 0 m = 0 maxp,x E(pI)
Full distribution (FD) aS = 1, aF = 1 m = 0 maxp,x E(pI)
Cooperation (CO) aS = 0, aF = 0 m 2 [0, 1/2] maxp,x E(pI + pE)
Table 1: Access regimes and parameter settings
Last, I consider regulatory holidays (RH), i.e. a case in which the incumbent faces no
access obligation at all. By contrast to NW and similar to the situation in the US broadband
markets17 neither the old nor the new network is regulated. This setup provides a benchmark
primarily regarding the investment incentives. For the sake of simplicity, I abstract from the
opportunity that the entrant negotiate for access or is able to compete by building its own
network.
2.3 Firm’s proﬁt maximization
Regulated access and cooperation In the access regimes $ = L, FD,CO, the vertically















and consists of its retail and its wholesale revenues as well as its investment costs. The
revenues in the case of success and failure of the NGA are weighted with the probabilities
16Based on this simpliﬁcation, possible effects of the regulation of the old network on the demand for services
on the new network are not considered. For such an analysis, see Bourreau et al. (2011).
17Cf. FCC (2003), FCC (2005).
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0 < b < 1 and 1  b. The investment costs (gx2)/2 are assumed as strictly convex function
to capture the more than proportionally increasing investment costs for the provision of
better NGA technologies or higher coverage.18 The parameter m represents the portion of
the investment costs covered by a ﬁxed payment by the entrant if both ﬁrms cooperate.
Note that c represents the marginal costs at the retail level and that the marginal costs of
the network are normalized to zero in order to increase the comparability of the results to
NW’s ﬁndings.





E   c   wS$)qS
E) + (1  b)((p
F $





For simplicity, let us assume an equally efﬁcient entrant with identical marginal costs c for
providing the retail product. If the ﬁrms decide to cooperate, the entrant bears the ﬁxed part
of the investment costs (mgx2)/2 prior to investment. With regulated access, the entrant
does not participate in the investment costs, i.e. m = 0.
Regulatory holidays In the benchmark case without access regulation, the incumbent
maximize its expected proﬁts
E(pRH
I ) = b

(pS RH













which consist of its retail revenues in the success and in the failure case, weighted with
the probabilities, and the investment costs. As there is no second ﬁrm in the market by
assumption, the incumbent does not realize any wholesale revenues and has to bear the
whole investment costs.
2.4 Timing of the game
The game consists of four stages and the timing is as follows:
1. REGULATION
The regulator sets the access regime.
2. FIRMS’ COOPERATION DECISIONS
Firms decide whether to cooperate or not.
3. INVESTMENT STAGE
The incumbent chooses its investment level, i.e. the extent of the NGA roll-out.
18Cf. Elixmann et al. (2008) ﬁnd that FTTH requires about 5-times higher investments than FTTC. Alternatively,
one might interpret the roll-out of the NGA in a geographical context and interpret the more than
proportional cost increase in the context of the NGA roll-out in rural areas.
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4. PRICING STAGE
Both ﬁrms set their prices simultaneously and compete in the market. In the case with
regulatory holidays, the incumbent sets its retail price.
In the ﬁrst stage, the regulator sets a regulatory policy, i.e. LRIC or FD. As the regulator
sets the access regime ex ante, no commitment or hold-up problem occurs. Alternatively, the
LRIC regime might also be interpreted as a situation in which the regulator is not able to
credibly commit to consider the investment costs in the access fee ex post independent from
the success of the network. If the incumbent considers this as an unreliable commitment,
the outcome would be the same as in the case in which the regulator credibly commits not
to consider the investment costs in the failure case.
In the second stage, the ﬁrms decide whether to cooperate or not. The ﬁrms will only
chose this opportunity if the proﬁt of each ﬁrm is higher compared to a situation with
regulated access. If at least one ﬁrm refuses to cooperate, access is provided with the given
regulatory access regime. This is a major difference to NW’s setup as the cooperation
decision is endogenized in this framework and not enforceable by the regulatory authority.
In the third stage, the incumbent maximizes its total expected proﬁts via the extent of the
NGA roll-out. Remember that the incumbent will maximize the expected joint proﬁts of the
ﬁrms if both agree to cooperate given the competition on the downstream market.
In the fourth stage, both ﬁrms compete in prices in the retail markets. The motivation for
price competition is based on the observation of ﬁerce price competition in most broadband
markets due to the ex post incentive to utilize the infrastructure.
3 Equilibria
In the following subsections, I solve the four stages of the game recursively to determine the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
3.1 Pricing stage
In the last stage of the game, the ﬁrms maximize their proﬁts with respect to the price
depending on both the extent and the success of the NGA roll-out and given the regulatory
regime. Hence, the ﬁrms maximize their proﬁts in the realized state of the world, i.e. either




















E   c   w`$)q`
E (9)
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with ` = S, F and $ = L, FD,CO. As the investment costs are already sunk in the pricing
stage, they are not considered in the proﬁt maximization problem of the ﬁrms in this stage
of the game.
Rearranging the incumbent’s proﬁt functions and substituting the access fee from Equation
























E   c   w`$)q`
E.
Both proﬁt functions are symmetric beside the investment costs f(x) = (gx2)/2. This
symmetry between both ﬁrms is based on the modeling of the access fee and in line with
NW and with Klumpp & Su (2010)’s revenue neutral access fee formulation.
Regulated access and cooperation In the regimes LRIC, FD, and CO, we substitute the
access fee w`$ according to equation (4) into the proﬁt functions (8) and (9) and differentiating








n + c   2p
` $
i   s(n   p
` $
j )





(1+ s)(n + yx   p
` $
j )





! = 0 (10)
with i, j = I,E and i 6= j. Note that the ﬁrms have symmetric ﬁrst order conditions as both
face the same opportunity costs of using the NGA.




(c + (3  2s)(n + yx))  
q




where y = 1 if the NGA succeeds and y = 0 if the NGA fails. The value of the access
parameter a`$ in the different regimes are as presented in Table 1. Note that the equilibrium
prices exist even if the NGA fails, i.e. y = 0 and the entrant has to bear a part of the
investment costs, i.e. aF = 1, as long as (gx2)/2  (n   c)2/4. This condition states that
the total investment costs has to be less or equal to the monopoly proﬁt if the NGA fails
and is therefore always satisﬁed by assumption.19 The equilibrium prices of both ﬁrms
19A monopoly supplier would invest as long as its proﬁts are non-negative, i.e. as long as (n   c)2/4  f(x).
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increase with the extent of the NGA roll-out x as long as either a`$ or y equal 1. If the NGA
is a success, i.e. for y = 1, the reservation utility of the consumers increases and the ﬁrms
increase their prices accordingly. In the full distribution regime, prices increase with the
extent of investment even if the NGA fails, i.e. for y = 0. In this case, the investment costs
are passed to both ﬁrms via the access fee, i.e. aF FD = 1, and the ﬁrms adjust their prices to
their increasing marginal (access) costs.
Due to the symmetry of the ﬁrst-order conditions, both ﬁrms charge identical prices in
equilibrium. Hence, we get a symmetric equilibrium in which both ﬁrms provide the same
quantities and charge the same prices. Irrespective of product differentiation, the result of
NW holds with price competition.20







n + yx + c  
q
(n + yx   c)2   2a`$gx2

= c + w`$js=1.
Hence, both ﬁrms set their prices according to their marginal costs of providing the retail
product c plus the access fee w and the typical Bertrand-outcome for price competition with
homogeneous goods applies. For s < 1, the equilibrium prices contain a mark-up based on
the product differentiation.









Again, the investment costs are sunk and therefore not considered in this stage of the game.





=n + yx + c   2p` RH
I
! = 0
and solving for the price the equilibrium price
p` RH
I =
n + yx + c
2
. (12)
Hence, let us assume that this is indeed the case and the investment costs are sufﬁciently low that at least
one ﬁrm might bear them without the risk of negative proﬁts in the failure case.
20Note that this symmetry holds not only for two but for n ﬁrms as long as the ﬁrms face identical costs,
identical reservation utilities and the same regulatory regime.
21Appendix A.1 provides an analytical proof of this statement.
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This monopoly price increases with the willingness to pay n, with the extent of the infras-
tructure investment x if the NGA succeeds, and with the marginal costs c.
Comparison of the results In order to compare the different regimes for a given investment
level x, let us compare the expected prices
E(p
$
i ) = bp
S$
i + (1  b)p
F$
i (13)










with i = I,E and $ = L, FD,CO,RH.
From the equilibrium prices in equation (11), we can immediately capture two aspects.
First, the expected prices are always the lowest if the ﬁrms cooperate. As aF CO = aS CO = 0,
the value of the square root in Equation (11) is always greater than in the other regimes
independent from the success of the NGA. Both ﬁrms face lower marginal access costs on
the downstream market if the NGA succeeds and therefore charge lower prices. Hence,
the expected prices are below the expected prices with regulated access. Secondly, the
expected prices in the full distribution regime are always greater those in the LRIC regime.
If the NGA succeeds, both prices are the same for given investment while prices differ if
the NGA fails. With full distribution of costs, aF FD equals 1 whereas aF L equals 0 with a
LRIC regulation. Hence, the price reduction based on the square root is lower with full
distribution and therefore expected prices are higher. The intuition is straightforward: In
the full distribution regime, both ﬁrms face higher marginal access costs on the downstream
market if the NGA fails and consequently charge higher prices.
Substituting the equilibrium prices (11) in the demand functions yields the equilibrium




n + yx   c +
q




with i = I,E and $ = L, FD,CO. For a given investment level x, the results from above
apply analogously. The highest expected total quantity is provided with cooperation and
the least expected total quantity is provided in the full distribution regime.
Next, let us consider the case with regulatory holidays. The comparison of the equilibrium
price in the RH regime with the price in the CO case reveals that cooperation yields strictly
lower expected prices. The results of the comparison of the equilibrium prices in the RH
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regime with the access regulation regimes LRIC and FD are ambiguous for a given level of
investment. Subject to the success of the NGA and the degree of product differentiation, we
can distinguish different outcomes. First, let us consider the case in which the NGA becomes
a success and prices in the LRIC and in the FD regime are identical. For a high degree of
product differentiation, prices with regulated access might be higher than in the case with
the RH regime. This result receives an intuitive explanation if we consider the case with
independent goods in which both ﬁrms charge the monopoly price, i.e. charge a price equal
to their costs plus the monopoly markup. The costs, i.e. the sum of the variable costs and
the access price, are higher in the cases with regulated entry as an unregulated monopolist
does not face any access fees or opportunity costs of using the network. Consequently, the
prices with two ﬁrms in the market facing access costs are higher than in the case with only
one ﬁrm in the market who does not face any access costs. If we look at the other extreme,
i.e. at the situation with (nearly) perfect substitutes, prices equal costs and the monopoly
price is higher than in the cases with regulated access. Secondly, let us compare the prices
in the failure case. The prices in the FD regime might be greater than the price with in the
RH regime. This applies if there is a high degree of product differentiation and the same
reasoning as in the success case applies. The prices in the LRIC regime are always lower
or equal to the monopoly price. This is intuitive if we consider independent products as
starting point in which both ﬁrms charge the monopoly price, i.e. their costs plus a mark-up.
In opposite to the success case, the costs for the investment is not considered in the access
fee and the ﬁrms face the same costs as an unregulated monopolist. Consequently, prices are
the same. As prices decrease with the degree of product homogeneity, it is straightforward
that prices with LRIC regulation might not exceed the price in the RH regime.
Proposition 1 summarizes the above ﬁndings:
Proposition 1. For 0 < b < 1, 0  s  1,
g
2x2 < 1
4(n   c)2,22 and a given investment level
x > 0, it applies
(i) E(pCO
i ) < E(pL
i ) < E(pFD
i )
(ii) E(QCO) > E(QL) > E(QFD).
22As discussed above, gx2/2 < (n   c)2/4 is not a necessary but a a sufﬁcient condition to ensure that the
square root is non-negative. Note that the investment costs might be greater if the NGA is a success, i.e.
for y = 1, or if the investment costs are not passed via the access fee in the failure case, i.e. for aF = 0.
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Compared to the situation with regulatory holidays, it applies
(i) E(pRH





i for s > ˆ s with $ = FD, L
(iii) pF RH
I > pF FD
i for s > ˘ s and pF RH
I  pF L
i .
Proof. A formal proof is provided in Appendix A.2. 
Consequently, for a given level of investment, cooperation yields the lowest prices and
highest expected total output. If the regulator implements access regulation, full distribution
yields the highest prices and lowest expected output even if the NGA fails. The comparison
between regulatory holidays and the regimes with regulated access is ambiguous. RH yields
higher prices as FD and LRIC in the success case if the product differentiation of the retail
products is not too high. If the NGA fails, the prices with RH are always higher compared
to the LRIC regime but are lower than the prices in the FD regime if the products are nearly
independent. If we compare our ﬁndings to the result of NW, it becomes obvious that price
competition does not change the competition intensity, as NW call it, compared to a setup
with Cournot-competition.
3.2 Investment stage
In the investment stage, the incumbent chooses the extent of the NGA deployment. Subject
to the ﬁrms’ decision about a cooperation in the previous stage of the game, the incumbent
either maximize its own expected proﬁts or the expected joint proﬁts of both ﬁrms.
Regulated Access First, Let us consider the case in which the ﬁrms disagree to cooperate.
The incumbent maximize its expected proﬁts given the access regime $ = L, FD and under
consideration of the equilibrium prices and quantitites in the last stage of the game. The






















The incumbent maximizes its expected proﬁt with respect to the investment level x. The
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(n   c)2   1
2aF$gx2(2  s)(1+ s)2.
The terms in the ﬁrst line represent the marginal revenue of the investment in the success
case. The terms in the second and third line represent the investment costs for providing
the infrastructure lowered by the access payments of the entrant.
The ﬁrst insight is straightforward: If the success of the NGA is certain, i.e. for b = 1, the
term in the third line disappears and both access regimes have the same ﬁrst order condition.
Consequently, as aS FD = aS L = 1, the optimal investment in both regimes is the same.
As a next step, let us consider the case in which the incumbent does not invest, i.e. x = 0.





   
x=0
=
2b(1  s)(n   c)
(2  s)2(1+ s)
.
From this equation it becomes obvious that the choice of no investment is only optimal, i.e.
only satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition, if either the retail products are perfect substitutes,
i.e. if s = 1, or if there is no probability of success of the NGA, i.e. if b = 0. Note that this
ﬁnding does not necessarily hold inversely. If we assume homogeneous retail products and








=  gx(1  baS$   (1  b)aF$).
In the FD regime, i.e. for aS FD = aF FD = 1, the ﬁrst order condition is always satisﬁed
and a positive investment level x might also be optimal. Contrary to this, the derivative of
the proﬁt function in the LRIC regime, i.e. for aS L = 1 and aF L = 0, is strictly negative.
Consequently, if both ﬁrms provide homogeneous retail products, the ﬁrm will never invest
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in the LRIC regime. This is a major difference to NW’s setup with Cournot-competition as
LRIC always yields positive investment in their setup if there is a positive probability of
success. Given rather homogeneous products and ﬁerce competition on the retail market,
the new infrastructure will never be built. Hence, there exists a signiﬁcant difference
between the modeling with Cournot competition and price competition. Additionally, the
trade-off between static and dynamic efﬁciency, i.e. ﬁercer retail competition with a given
infrastructure and incentives to invest in new infrastructures, becomes evident in this case.
Finally, let us compare the investment incentives in both access regimes in general by
assuming that in both cases the same investment level x is chosen. Subtracting the derivative














(n   c)(1  s2)
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If the success of the NGA is uncertain, i.e. for b < 1, the ﬁrst term is strictly non-negative.
The term in brackets is non-negative for
g
2
x2  (n   c)2 s(s + 1)2 + 12
(5  s)2(s + 1)2.
Note that for homogeneous goods, i.e. s = 1, the second expression on the right-hand
side is minimized and equals 1/4. Hence, if the investment costs are weakly lower than
(n   c)2/4, the derivative of the proﬁt function in the FD regime is always greater than the
derivative of the proﬁt function in the LRIC regime. This means that the investment level
x which satisﬁes the ﬁrst order condition in the LRIC regime yields a positive derivative
of the proﬁt function in the FD regime. Consequently, the investment incentives in the FD
regime are always greater as proﬁts increase if the ﬁrm choses a higher investment level.
Cooperation Let us now consider the case in which both ﬁrms decided to cooperate in
the second stage of the game. In this case, the incumbent maximizes the joint proﬁts of the
ﬁrms under consideration of the competitive retail prices and quantities in the subsequent
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with aS CO = aF CO = 0. The derivative of the joint proﬁt function with respect to the






4(n + x   c)(1  s)
(2  s)2(1+ s)
  gx
! = 0 (19)
and solving for the optimal investment yields
xCO =
4b(n   c)(1  s)
g(2  s)2(1+ s)   4b(1  s)
. (20)
If the ﬁrms decide to cooperate, it is only optimal not to invest if the products are perfect
substitutes, i.e. for s = 1, or if there is no probability of success, i.e. for b = 0. Otherwise,
the incumbent will always invest in the NGA. Note that the incumbent’s investment decision
is independent from the entrant’s participation in the investment costs, i.e. independent
from m.
Regulatory holidays If the incumbent does not face any access obligations, it maximizes its
expected proﬁt under consideration of the equilibrium prices in the pricing stage. Therefore,
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The optimal investment in the RH regime increases with the willingness to pay n and with
the probability of success b whereas it decreases with the investment cost parameter g and
with the marginal costs c. Note that the the incumbent will always invest in this regime as
long as there is a positive probability of success, i.e. as long as b > 0 applies.
Comparison of the results Even though the ﬁrst order condition (17) does not provide a
closed-form solution, the previous discussion allows us to note the following propositions:
Proposition 2. For homogeneous goods, i.e. for s = 1, the incumbent might only invest in the
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NGA if the regulator implements the FD regime or if there are no access obligations. If the regulator
implements a LRIC regime or if the ﬁrms decide to cooperate, the optimal investment level x equals
zero.
Proof. Follows from the discussion above. 
These ﬁndings are a major difference to NW’s ﬁndings. Given their setup with Cournot-
competition, ﬁrms are always able to charge a price above costs. Considering the intense
service-based competition in telecommunications, the threat of no investment in new
infrastructure seems at least somewhat plausible and should be taken into account.
Proposition 3. For 0 < b < 1 and 0  s  1, it applies
(i) xFD  xL
(ii) xCO > xL for 0  s < ˜ s(b) and xCO  xL for ˜ s(b)  s  1
(iii) xCO > xRH for 0  s < ˇ s  0.61 and xCO  xRH for ˇ s  0.61  s  1
Proof. For a proof of the ﬁrst statement, see the argumentation above. For a proof of the
second and the third statement, see Appendix A.3. 
Simulations of the optimal investment decisions x$ give some more detailed insights about
the NGA deployment in the different regimes. Figure 1 illustrates the relation between the
investment in the three regimes for different ranges of s and b.
Figure 1: Relative equilibrium investment subject to b and s
(for n = 100, c = 20, and g = 5)
The results from Proposition 3 and the simulation are similar to NW’s ﬁndings. The
higher investment incentives with FD compared with LRIC are intuitive. The symmetric
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risk allocation allows the incumbent to invest more as the investment costs will be partially
covered by the entrant independent from the NGA’s success. Therefore, the incumbent is
not put at competitive disadvantage if the NGA fails. A difference to NW is that cooperation
might yield higher investment than FD and LRIC subject to product differentiation and risk.
Cooperation seems to be favorable with respect to the investment incentives if the products
are highly differentiated. If the degree of product differentiation decreases (s increases),
LRIC yields higher investment as cooperation if the probability of success is relatively high
(regions C, D, and E). The lower the product differentiation (the higher s), the higher
might be the investment risk for which LRIC is superior to CO. Regulatory holidays yield
lower investment as FD but might yield higher investment as LRIC if either the degree of
product differentiation is low (s is high) or if the probability of success is low (regions E, F,
and G). Compared to cooperation, regulatory holidays yields higher investment for closer
substitutes independent from the probability of success (regions D, E, and F).
3.3 Firms’ cooperation decision
In the second stage of the game, the ﬁrms decide whether to cooperate or to use the given
access regime. With a given regulatory access regime $ = L, FD, the proﬁts of the ﬁrms
are as deﬁned in equations (5) and (6) without a ﬁxed participation of the entrant in the
investment costs, i.e. with m = 0. If the ﬁrms decide to cooperate, the entrant bears a ﬁxed
part of the investment costs m. Based on the results in the pricing stage, i.e. a symmetric
equilibrium in which both ﬁrms provide services for the same retail price and consequently
sell the same quantities, let us assume that both ﬁrms provide each other access on a
bill-and-keep basis.23 The ﬁrms’ proﬁts with cooperation then read
E(pCO









































with the entrant’s share of the investment costs m 2 [0,1/2].
In the following, I discuss three different cases. First, I analyze the case in which the
entrant does not participate in the investment costs, i.e. m = 0. This case is motivated by
NW’s setup and allows us to compare this setup with price competition and differentiated
retail products to their ﬁndings. A major difference to their model is that they interpret this
regime as risk-sharing and therefore as a regulatory access regime. In this setup, I assume
23As stated in footnote 15, the assumption about bill-and-keep omits the opportunity that both ﬁrms charge
each other a positive fee in order to increase their marginal costs in order to charge higher retail prices. In
this setup, I can show that a positive access fee has always a negative effect on the entrant’s proﬁts and that
the entrant will only agree to such an access fee if the incumbent makes a side-payment to the entrant.
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that ﬁrms voluntarily decide whether they want to cooperate and might not be forced to
cooperation by the regulator. Secondly, I will consider a setup in which both ﬁrms share the
investment costs equally, i.e. m = 1/2. Thirdly, I consider the case that the entrant partially
participates in the investment costs, i.e. 0 < m < 1/2.
A ﬁrm will agree to cooperate if its expected proﬁt is at least as large as its expected
proﬁt with regulated access, i.e. if E(pCO
i )  E(p
$
i ) with $ = L, FD, M applies. Only if both
ﬁrms prefer a joint roll-out the cooperation is carried out. If at least one ﬁrm disagrees, the
regulatory access regime is realized. As there is no closed-form solution of the investment
decisions in the LRIC and the FD regime, I numerically simulate the proﬁts in the different
regimes under consideration of the equilibrium prices and equilibrium investment in the
third and fourth stage of the game.
No risk participation of the entrant Let us ﬁrst consider the case without participation of
the entrant, i.e. with m = 0, as a benchmark based on NW’s setup.
Figure 2a illustrates the incumbent’s proﬁt maximizing regimes subject to the probability
of success b and the degree of product differentiation s. The numerical simulations show
that the incumbent will never agree to a cooperation if the entrant does not bear a part
of the investment costs. The proﬁt with cooperation is inferior to all other opportunities,
i.e. for 0 < b < 1 and 0  s  1 applies E(pRH
I ),E(pFD
I ),E(pLRIC
I ) > E(pCO
I ). This
is straightforward: compared to the cases with regulated access, the incumbent would
only provide costless access and waive the wholesale revenues if it agrees to cooperate.
Interestingly, the incumbent might prefer regulated access to the monopoly outcome if the
products are sufﬁciently heterogeneous (Region A and B) as the additional wholesale proﬁts
dominate the decreasing proﬁts due to competition.
Figure 2b illustrates the entrant’s proﬁt maximizing regimes subject to the probability
of success b and the degree of product differentiation s. The entrant prefers cooperation
to regulated access if the products are sufﬁciently heterogeneous (Region A and Region
B). For homogeneous products, i.e. for high s, the entrant prefers the regulated access
and will refuse to cooperate. If the success of the new infrastructure is nearly certain, the
entrant’s proﬁts are maximized with LRIC regulation as the expected access fee is lower
for b < 1 and the incumbent’s investment incentives are already sufﬁciently high (Region
B). For some uncertainty about the NGA’s success, the entrant realizes higher proﬁts in
the FD regime (Region C). At ﬁrst view, it might look inconsistent that the entrant prefers
regulated access to a regime with costless access but the intuition is straight forward: if the
products are very homogeneous, the negative effect of ﬁercer retail competition on proﬁts
is dominated by the higher investment incentives of the incumbent with regulated access.
This also explains why the entrant realizes higher proﬁts with the FD regime than with the
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LRIC regime if the success of the NGA is uncertain. The higher the incumbent’s investment
incentives due to higher product differentiation, i.e. for a lower s, the lower the probability
of success b for which the entrant is indifferent between the LRIC and FD regime. If the
product differentiation is sufﬁciently high due to the high degree of product differentiation,
the additional investment incentives based on the access payments become less important
and the entrant would prefer to cooperate.
(a) Incumbent’s proﬁts (b) Entrant’s proﬁts
Figure 2: Equilibrium proﬁts subject to b and s (for n = 100, c = 20, g = 5, and m = 0)
Equal risk participation of both ﬁrms Let us now consider the case in which the entrant
bears half of the investment costs, i.e. m = 1/2.
Figure 3 illustrates the ﬁrms’ maximum proﬁts in the different regimes as a function of
the probability of success b and the product differentiation parameter s. The simulation
shows that both ﬁrms will – independent from the regulatory access regime – only agree to
cooperate for a small range of parameter values in which the probability of success is very
high and products are nearly independent (region A in Figure 3b). For highly differentiated
goods, both ﬁrms might also chose to cooperate, even for lower probabilities of success and
lower degree of product differentiation, if the regulator implements a FD access regulation
(intersection of Region A in Figure 3a and Region A and B in Figure 3b).
An interesting insight from this illustration is that the incentives of both ﬁrms might
fall apart. The incumbent realizes higher proﬁts with cooperation for almost all parameter
combinations if the regulator implements a FD regulation. If the regulator implements
a LRIC access regime, the incumbent might prefer a cooperation agreement, especially if
the success of the NGA is relatively uncertain (Region B). Hence, in order to increase the
incumbent’s cooperation incentives, the regulator has to implement a LRIC regulation. In
opposite to this, the entrant prefers the LRIC regime to cooperation for almost all parameter
values. This becomes clear if we reconsider the above case with m = 0: due to the high ﬁxed
costs, cooperation becomes worse in comparison to regulated access. The proﬁtability of
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cooperation decreases and – graphically – shifts to the upper left side, i.e. only exists for
very heterogeneous goods and a high probability of success.
(a) Incumbent’s proﬁts (b) Entrant’s proﬁts
Figure 3: Equilibrium proﬁts subject to b and s (for n = 100, c = 20, g = 5, and m = 1/2)
Partial risk participation of the entrant The key problem to get ﬁrms into a cooperation
agreement are the diverting incentives of both ﬁrms. On the one hand, the entrant’s proﬁts
decrease with the share of investment costs m and cooperation becomes less attractive in
comparison to regulated access. On the other hand, the incumbent strictly prefers regulated
access to cooperation if the entrant does not bear a part of the investment costs. In the
case with equally shared investment costs, the entrant’s incentives for cooperation are too
weak and consequently, both ﬁrms will only agree to cooperate in very few cases. Above
results change if we consider the case in which the entrant bears only some fraction of the
investment costs, i.e. 0 < m < 1/2.
Figure 4 illustrates the parameter ranges for which both ﬁrms prefer cooperation to LRIC
for different shares m. The parameter combinations for which the proﬁts are higher with
cooperation than with LRIC are marked by the dotted area for the incumbent and by the
dashed area for the entrant. The gray shaded intersection represents the intersection of
both areas, i.e. the parameter combinations for which both ﬁrms prefer to roll-out the
infrastructure jointly instead of using the LRIC access regime and cooperation takes place.
Intuitively, the higher the share of the investment costs covered by the entrant m, the
greater the range of parameters for which the incumbent prefers cooperation and for which
the entrant prefers regulated access and vice versa. Thereby, the incumbent’s preference for
cooperation is less based on the degree of product differentiation but on the probability of
success of the NGA. The entrant’s decision between the LRIC regime and cooperation is
subject to both parameters. The higher the product differentiation, the higher the entrant’s
willingness to cooperate even in situations with a high probability of success. Below the line,
it follows that the decision of the ﬁrms is less based on the degree of product differentiation
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(a) m = 0.3 (b) m = 0.35 (c) m = 0.4 (d) m = 0.45
Figure 4: Firms prefer cooperation to LRIC subject to b and s for different shares m
(for n = 100, c = 20, and g = 5)
but on the probability of success.
Above discussion is summarized with the following remark:
Remark 1. Firms might agree to cooperate if and only if the entrant bears a part of the investment
risk, i.e. covers a part of the investment costs. The cooperation decision is then subject to the
implemented access regulation $ = L, FD, the degree of product differentiation s and the probability
that the new infrastructure becomes a success b.
(i) If the regulator implements the LRIC regime, cooperation will only take place if the investment
risk is relatively high. The greater the degree of product differentiation, the greater the range of risk
for which both ﬁrms agree to roll-out the infrastructure jointly. Thereby, the cooperation decision is
crucially subject to the entrant’s share of the investment costs m.
(ii) If the regulator implements the FD regime or no access obligation, ﬁrms might only agree to
cooperate if the products are nearly independent and the success of the new infrastructure is very
high.
To summarize, in NW’s setup without a risk participation of the entrant, i.e. for m = 0,
ﬁrms will never cooperate as the incumbent always prefer regulated access over cooperation.
If both ﬁrms bear half of the investment costs, i.e. for m = 1/2, cooperation will only
take place in a small range of parameter values, i.e. for nearly independent goods and a
nearly certain success of the new infrastructure. With an implemented FD regulation, the
entrant might agree to cooperate if the products are highly differentiated. Otherwise, the
entrant will prefer regulated access over cooperation. Given an unequal risk participation of
the entrant, i.e. 0 < m < 1/2, both ﬁrms might agree to jointly build the infrastructure if
the investment risk is sufﬁciently high and if the regulator implements a LRIC regulation.
Hence, the outside option, i.e. the implemented regulatory access regime, plays a crucial
role regarding the ﬁrms’ decision whether to cooperate.
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The threat of “late entry” The result that the implementation of the LRIC regime is
almost a precondition in order to achieve cooperation agreements raises a potential issue
regarding the robustness of the model. While all previous results seem to be qualitatively
robust even if more than two ﬁrms are in the market, as long as all ﬁrms face the same
conditions, the decision to jointly build the infrastructure does not necessarily hold for
three or more ﬁrms. Given a cooperation agreement of two ﬁrms and the opportunity
of “late entry”, additional ﬁrms might ask for access and compete in the retail market
if the success of the new infrastructure is revealed. Due to the higher investment with
cooperation, the equilibrium prices charged by the cooperating ﬁrms might be above the
access fee and ﬁrms without own infrastructures might undercut the cooperating ﬁrms’
prices. Consequently, such an opportunity would deﬁnitely decrease the ﬁrms’ incentives
to cooperate. In principle, there are several approaches to avoid such a distortion of the
cooperation incentives. One obvious solution is to release the cooperating ﬁrms from
any access obligation. In this case, access to late entrants would only be provided if the
cooperating ﬁrms agree to sell access to their infrastructure. However, it is questionable
how such a policy would affect the retail competition as this might raise concerns about
foreclosure and collusion. Another possible solution to this issue is currently discussed in
France:24 if a ﬁrm decides to invest in a NGA infrastructure, it has to inform its competitors
and provide the opportunity of a joint roll-out. Subject to the number of ﬁrms which build
the infrastructure cooperatively, there is an obligation to provide additional ﬁbers in order
to allow ﬁrms to enter the market after the infrastructure is in place. Thereby, the access
fee for late entrants includes a “risk-premium” which takes the initial investment risk into
account.
3.4 Optimal regulatory policy
In the ﬁrst stage of the game, the regulator has to decide which access regime to implement
and whether to allow cooperation between ﬁrms.
Consumer surplus maximizing policy As a ﬁrst step, let us assume that the regulator only
takes considers the consumer surplus but not the producer surplus. The consumer surplus
as function of the prices given the success of the NGA ` = S, F is derived from the utility
24Cf. Bourreau et al. (2010).
25Christian M. Bender How to provide access to next generation networks?














(n + yx$   p
`$
I )2 + (n + yx$   p
`$
E )2   2s(n + yx$   p
`$





We derive the expected consumer surplus subject to the investment, the realized regime
$ = FD, L,CO, the degree of product differentiation, and to the success of the NGA by
substituting the equilibrium prices from the pricing stage, i.e. Equation (11). Rearranging
yields the expected consumer surplus
E(CS$) =b
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Equation (22) reveals immediately that the expected consumer surplus is increasing with
the probability that the NGA succeeds. This is straightforward as a higher probability of
success increases the investment incentives and the negative effect of increasing prices is
dominated by the increasing reservation utility.
The expected consumer surplus with regulatory holidays is derived by substituting the
equilibrium price (12) and the equilibrium investment (21) in the consumer surplus function






























Again, the expected consumer surplus increases with the probability of success. From
Equation (22) and Equation (23) it follows that the expected consumer with regulatory
holidays is lower than in the other regimes for a given investment level. Reconsidering
the discussion and the simulations in the investment stage, it shows that regulatory holidays
is always the worst regime from consumers’ perspective, i.e. yield the lowest consumer
surplus. This result is intuitive if we consider total output in the different regimes: as the
access to the old network is not regulated in this setup, there is only one supplier in the
market and total quantity should be (almost) always lower as in the case with two ﬁrms in
the market. Consequently, total consumer surplus is lower if there is no competition in the
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market.
Given the results from the subsequent stages and that the ﬁrst order conditions in the
LRIC and FD regimes, i.e. Equation (17), do not provide closed-form solutions, it is
ambiguous which regimes yield the highest consumer surplus. The FD regime yields
the highest investment for most parameter range but also results in the highest expected
prices for a given investment level. Cooperation yield the highest investment only for
almost independent goods and a high probability of success of the NGA but yields the
lowest expected prices for a given investment level. The LRIC regime performs moderately
regarding the investment incentives and the expected price but seems important in order to
create a sufﬁcient willingness to cooperate. Hence, the net effect of the different regimes
is ambiguous and does not provide further insights regarding the question which regime
maximizes the social welfare. In order to get some further insights, I numerically simulated
the consumer surplus in the different regimes. Figure 5 illustrates a simulation for the
different parameter combinations for which the different regimes yield the highest consumer
surplus. Note that this is not the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium but the consumer
surplus maximizing regimes if the regulator might choose the access regime, i.e. is able to
enforce cooperation.
Figure 5: Relation of the expected consumer surplus in equilibrium subject to b and s
(for n = 100, c = 20, and g = 5)
For a sufﬁciently high degree of product differentiation (a sufﬁciently low s), cooperation
yields the highest consumer surplus (regions A) whereas the FD regime maximizes the
welfare if the products are closer substitutes (region B and C). Interestingly, the optimal
policy is rather subject to the degree of product differentiation than to the probability of
success. As discussed above, the simulation shows that regulatory holidays is the worst
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regime from the consumers’ point of view. The LRIC regulation always performs worse
than the FD regime as long as there is some degree of product differentiation, i.e. s < 1, and
the success of the new infrastructure is not certain, i.e. b < 1. The comparison between the
LRIC regulation and cooperation shows that LRIC might perform better if the products are
close substitutes and the probability of success is high, i.e. for parameter ranges for which
the ﬁrms will not agree to cooperate anyway. Intuitively, the relatively higher investment
incentives with LRIC in this parameter range dominate the positive effect of lower prices in
the cooperation case. In opposite to NW’s ﬁndings, there is no single regime which yields
always the highest consumer surplus. The optimal regime is subject to the degree of product
differentiation, an aspect which is not captured in NW’s Cournot setup with homogeneous
goods.
Remark 2. Subject to the degree of product differentiation either the FD regime or cooperation
maximize the consumer surplus.
(i) For low to intermediate levels of product differentiation, cooperation yields the highest con-
sumer surplus.
(ii) For intermediate to high levels of product differentiation, the FD regime maximizes the con-
sumer surplus.
The ﬁrst insight is that the optimal regulatory policy is, in particular, subject to the
degree of product differentiation in the retail market. On the one hand, if we only consider
telecommunications ﬁrms, i.e. ﬁrms with relatively homogeneous goods, the FD regime
seems best. The symmetric risk allocation between both ﬁrms yield higher investment
incentives. As competition is very intense in this case, i.e. retail prices are low, the negative
effect of higher access costs on retail prices is less important and dominated by the higher
investment incentives. On the other hand, we might consider ﬁrms from different markets
or industries. As an example, one might think about a power supplier who asks for access in
order to implement services related to smart grids. In this case, the LRIC regime might be
the best choice in order to create sufﬁcient incentives for the ﬁrms to agree to a cooperation
and the consumer surplus maximizing outcome might be realized based on the ﬁrms’
private proﬁt maximization incentive. The positive effect on competition due to the lower
access costs, i.e. an access fee of zero, dominates the decreasing investment incentives
in comparison with the FD regime. As discussed in the cooperation stage, this result is
probably subject to the assumption that there are only two ﬁrms in the market or – if there
are more than two ﬁrms – to the access conditions for late entrants. Another insight of the
simulation of the expected consumer surplus is that high investment does not necessarily
coincide with a high consumer surplus. A comparison of Figure 1 and Figure 5 reveals
that the investment incentives and consumer surplus may fall apart. Even though the FD
regime yield the highest investment for most parameter ranges, the higher prices and less
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intensive competition might dominate the positive investment incentive with symmetric risk
allocation. Hence, the well-known trade-off between static and dynamic efﬁciency applies.
Total surplus Let us now analyze the case in which the regulator considers the producer
surplus in its optimization process. Total expected welfare is then the sum of the consumer
surplus and the aggregated producer surplus, i.e.





As before, substituting the optimal prices and investment and simulating allows us to
compare the welfare in the different regimes for different parameter combinations. Figure 6
illustrates the results of the numerical simulation. Again, this is not the sub-game perfect
Nash equilibrium but the total surplus maximizing regime if the regulator might chose the
access regime, i.e. is able to enforce cooperation.
Figure 6: Relation of the expected welfare in equilibrium subject to b and s
(for n = 100, c = 20, and g = 5)
Qualitatively, the results are the same as in the case in which the regulator only takes the
consumer surplus into account. The range of parameter combinations for which cooperation
yields the highest welfare decreases (region A) in comparison to the above case. The
range for which full distribution of costs regulation is the welfare maximizing regime
increases (regions B and C). Hence, if the regulator accounts for the producer surplus in its
maximization problem, the FD regime becomes favorable for an increasing range of product
heterogeneity. For intermediate degrees of product differentiation, the increasing proﬁts
of the ﬁrms with the FD regime dominate the decreasing consumer surplus compared to
cooperation.
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Equilibrium outcome So far, we only discussed the consumer and total surplus in case
that the regulator might set the regime, i.e. is able to enforce cooperation. Let us now
consider a case in which the regulator sets the access regime subject to the degree of product
differentiation. If the products are sufﬁciently homogeneous and the FD regime is socially
optimal, the regulator sets the FD access price. Otherwise, i.e. for more heterogeneous retail
products for which cooperation would be socially optimal, the LRIC access prices applies.
Note that “crucial” degree of product differentiation, for which the regulator sets the one or
the other regime, differs subject to the maximization problem of the regulator, i.e. whether
it maximizes consumer surplus or total surplus. Figure 7 illustrates the equilibria outcomes
if the entrant bears 40 per cent of the investment costs in the cooperation case, i.e. m = 0.4.
(a) Consumer surplus (b) Total surplus
Figure 7: Equilibria subject to b and s (for n = 100, c = 20, g = 5, and m = 0.4)
Region A represents the parameter combinations in which cooperation would be the
consumer or total surplus maximizing regime but for which at least one ﬁrm prefers the
regulated access. From the regulator’s perspective, cooperation is desirable in this parameter
ranges but either the entrant, the incumbent, or both ﬁrms will not agree to jointly build the
infrastructure. As a result, the realized regime for this parameter combinations is worse as
the case with FD regulation. Region B represents the degree of product differentiation for
which the regulator sets a FD access regulation. For this degree of product homogeneity,
the incumbent always prefer regulated access to cooperation. In Region C, in which the
investment risk is sufﬁciently high, i.e. b is sufﬁciently low, the ﬁrms will agree to jointly
roll-out the infrastructure. The consumer or total surplus maximizing regime is realized as
the private cooperation incentives, based on the proﬁt maximization of ﬁrms, coincides with
the socially desirable outcome. Note that it is not clear whether the implementation of FD
regulation for all degrees of product differentiation or such a “differentiated” regulation
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based on the degree of product differentiation yields a higher consumer or total surplus.
Hence, a remaining question is how cooperations might be fostered in these cases with
heterogeneous goods and a high probability of success.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I discuss the effects of four different access regimes on competition and
investment incentives in NGA. The model compares two different regimes with access
obligations, one with symmetric and one with asymmetric risk allocation, with a joint roll-
out and an unregulated monopoly by adjusting the model from Nitsche & Wiethaus (2011).
First, I implement price competition with horizontal product differentiation. Secondly, I
interpret NW’s risk-sharing regime as cooperation between ﬁrms and analyzed explicitly
whether and under which conditions ﬁrms might agree to jointly build the infrastructure.
The analysis reveals three main aspects: First, the objective to foster investment, e.g. to
achieve speciﬁed coverage goals, might lead to situations in which the positive effect of
increasing investment incentives is dominated by the negative effect on competition. High
investment do not necessarily coincide with a high welfare and consumer surplus. The
reason is that regimes which encourage investment via symmetric risk allocation imply
higher access costs for all ﬁrms and consequently higher prices for the retail products even
if the new infrastructure fails. The positive investment incentives of such a regime are
then dominated by the negative price effect of investment and the risk of overinvestment
arises. The consumer surplus increases due to increasing investment and decreases due to
increasing prices and the net effect becomes negative. This is especially the case if retail
products are very heterogeneous and the probability of a success of the NGA is low. Hence,
the coverage goals discussed and predetermined by policy might yield an inferior market
outcome from consumers’ perspective if the focus is on the extent of NGA roll-out only and
the gains from dynamic efﬁciency are dominated by the losses of static efﬁciency.
Secondly, the private incentives to cooperate might, at least partially, yield an outcome in
which the ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximization also maximizes consumer surplus and total welfare.
A crucial aspect in order to derive beneﬁt from the private cooperation incentives is the
provided outside option, i.e. the realized access regime, and the risk allocation between the
ﬁrms. Subject to the implemented access regime, the private incentives to cooperate might
be distorted such that the ﬁrms will not chose the consumer surplus maximizing regime.
The results show that cooperation is superior to regulated access especially if ﬁrms provide
differentiated goods. As a consequence, the focus of regulatory authorities and policy
should be on actions to foster and to support cooperation between ﬁrms from different
infrastructure industries. As the incentives to cooperate might differ between investing and
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access seeking ﬁrms, it seems reasonable to discuss additional instruments either to increase
the willingness to cooperate, e.g. subsidization, or to create “soft pressure” on ﬁrms.
Thirdly, the optimal regulatory regime is subject to the probability of success of the
new infrastructure but even more to the degree of product differentiation in the retail
market. An access regulation with a symmetric risk allocation maximizes the surplus
if the products are rather homogeneous whereas cooperation maximizes the surplus for
rather heterogeneous products. As discussed, ﬁrms will in almost all cases only agree to
cooperate if the regulator implements an access regulation with asymmetric risk allocation.
Hence, regulatory authorities should probably put a higher weight on the type of ﬁrms
seeking access to the new infrastructure. It might be favorable to provide ﬁrms from other
infrastructure industries, e.g. for electricity suppliers who need access to telecommunication
infrastructures in order to operate smart grids, different access conditions than competitors
from the same industry.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof: For homogeneous goods, prices equal marginal costs






n + yx + c  
q
(n + yx   c)2   2a`$gx2

.
The access fee w`$ in equilibrium equals
w`$ =
a`$gx2(2  s)(1+ s)
2(n + yx   c) +
q
4(n + yx   c)2   2a`$gx2(2  s)(1+ s)2
.
The ﬁrms marginal costs in the case of homogeneous goods are
MC = w`$ + c =
a`$gx2
n + yx   c +
q




i   MC = 0.

A.2 Proof of Proposition 1




(c + (3  2s)(n + yx))  
q
(n + yx   c)2   1
2a`$gx2(2  s)(s + 1)2
2(2  s)
and expected prices by
E(p
$
i ) = bp
S$
i + (1  b)p
F$
i
with $ = L, FD,CO and i = I,E.
Subtracting the expected prices in the different cases for a given investment level x > 0
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yields
E(pFD




(n   c)  
q









(n + x   c)  
q




For 0 < b < 1, both expressions are strictly positive and consequently E(pFD
i ) > E(pL
i ) >
E(pCO
i ) applies. For a given investment level x, the expected quantities decrease with the
expected prices and consequently E(QCO) > E(QL) > E(QFD) applies.
In the success case, subtracting the incumbent’s price with regulatory holidays from the
equilibrium price in the regimes with regulated access, i.e. with $ = L, FD, yields
p
S $
i   pS RH
I =
(n + x   c)(1  s)  
q




Given our assumptions, this term is strictly negative if either x = 0 or
s > ˆ s =
(n + x   c)

n + x   c  
p
(n + x   c)2   2gx2

gx2 .
Hence, it applies pS RH
I > p
S $
i for s > ˆ s.
In the success case, subtracting the incumbent’s price with regulatory holidays from the
equilibrium price with cooperation yields
pS CO
i   pS RH
I =  
s(n + x   c)
2(2  s)
< 0
and in the failure case
pF CO





Hence, the price in the cooperation case is always below the price in the monopoly case, i.e.
E(pRH
I ) > E(pCO
i ).
In the failure case, subtracting the incumbent’s price with regulatory holidays from the
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equilibrium price in the FD regime yields
pF FD
i   pF RH
I =
(n   c)(1  s)  
q
(n   c)2   1
2gx2(2  s)(1+ s)2
2(2  s)
Given our assumptions, this term is strictly negative if
s > ˘ s =
(n   c)

n   c  
p
(n   c)2   2gx2

gx2 .
Hence, it applies pS RH
I > pF FD
i for s > ˘ s.
In the failure case, subtracting the incumbent’s price with regulatory holidays from the
equilibrium price in the LRIC regime yields
pF L






I  pF L
i applies. 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
xCO > xL for 0  s < ˜ s and xCO  xL for ˜ s  s  1
The ﬁrst order conditions in the LRIC regime and with cooperation for independent goods,
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Substituting the optimal investment in the case of cooperation in the derivative of the proﬁt





g(b2   g(2  b))
p
g   b2 + g(6  5b)
!
< 0
As the ﬁrst order condition with LRIC with the optimal investment level with cooperation
xCO is strictly negative, the incumbent would chose a lower investment level and it applies
xCO > xL for s = 0.
Now let us consider the case with perfect substitutes, i.e. s = 1. The ﬁrst order condition




   
s=1





   
s=1
=   gx
If the retail goods are perfect substitutes, the only optimal investment in both regimes is
xCO = xL = 0.








4b(n   c)(1  s(1  s))





   
x=0
=  
8b(n   c)(1  s(1  s))
(2  s)3(s + 1)2
Obviously the slope of the ﬁrst order condition is higher in the case with cooperation for
b > 0. As a consequence, if we decrease s marginally below 1, the investment incentive
is higher in the case with LRIC and therefore xL > xCO has to apply for s = 1   e with
e ! 0.
From above arguments follows that the investment is higher in the LRIC regime if the
goods are close substitutes and higher with cooperation if the goods are highly differentiated.
Figure A.1 illustrates the optimal investment in both regimes subject to the degree of product
differentiation.
Hence, given a probability b there exists a ˜ s(b) with 0 < ˜ s(b) < 1 for which both regimes
yield the same investment levels and xCO > xL for 0  s < ˜ s(b) and xCO  xL for
˜ s(b)  s  1 applies.
xCO > xRH for 0  s < ˇ s  0.61 and xCO  xRH for ˇ s  0.61  s  1
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Figure A.1: Equilibrium investment with cooperation and LRIC subject to s
(for n = 100, c = 20, g = 5, and b = 0.7)
Subtracting the optimal investment with regulatory holidays from the optimal investment
with cooperation yields
xCO   xRH = b(n   c)

4(1  s)





For b > 0, n > c, and 0  s  1 the equation equals zero for

















For s > ˇ s, the equation is strictly positive and for s < ˇ s strictly negative and xCO > xRH
for 0  s < ˇ s  0.61 and xCO  xRH for ˇ s  0.61  s  1 applies. 
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